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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rachel Luna appeals from her judgment of conviction for abuse, exploitation, or neglect
of a vulnerable adult. She argued in her Appellant’s Brief that the district court erred by
prohibiting her from presenting evidence regarding other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and
other women, and regarding checks she wrote pursuant to her power of attorney on
Mr. Hofferber’s bank account, because this evidence was relevant, and was not inadmissible
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404. (Appellant’s Br., pp.8-14.) Ms. Luna also argued the district
court erred in instructing the jury regarding the requirements for gift-giving under the Uniform
Power of Attorney Act because the instruction resulted in a fatal variance. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.15-22.) She submits this Reply Brief to address the State’s argument on these issues.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Luna included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her Appellant’s
Brief, which she relies on and incorporates herein. (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-6.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by prohibiting Ms. Luna from presenting evidence regarding
other gifts given by Mr. Hofferber to her and other women, and regarding checks she
wrote pursuant to her power of attorney on Mr. Hofferber’s bank account?

II.

Did the district court err in instructing the jury regarding the requirements for gift-giving
under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Prohibiting Ms. Luna From Presenting Evidence Regarding Other
Gifts Given By Mr. Hofferber To Her And Other Women, And Regarding Checks She Wrote
Pursuant To Her Power Of Attorney On Mr. Hofferber’s Bank Account

A.

The Evidence Ms. Luna Sought To Introduce Was Relevant
The district court erred in concluding that evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s history of giving

gifts to Ms. Luna and other woman, and evidence of Ms. Luna’s access to Mr. Hofferber’s funds
through the bank power of attorney, was not relevant under I.R.E. 401. As Ms. Luna argued in
her Appellant’s Brief, the standard for relevance is low, and the proffered evidence easily met
the standard because it was relevant to Ms. Luna’s theory of the case. (Appellant’s Br., pp.9-11.)
In order to find Ms. Luna guilty of Count II (the count on which she was convicted), the
jury had to find she exploited Mr. Hofferber when she took funds exceeding $1,000 from the sale
of his house, for her own use. (R., p.155.) The jury was instructed that “exploitation” includes
“the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult’s financial power of attorney, funds, property or
resources.” (R., p.156.) The State argues in its Respondent’s Brief that evidence of
Mr. Hofferber’s history of giving gifts to Ms. Luna and other women, and giving Ms. Luna free
access to his bank account through the bank power of attorney, is irrelevant to the question of
whether Ms. Luna’s actions were unjust or improper. (Respondent’s Br., p.13.) The State asserts
this “follows not only from common-sense, but from Idaho law and the explicit terms for the
springing power of attorney that became effective when Mr. Hofferber was incapacitated.”
(Respondents’ Br., p.14.) The State’s argument misses the mark.
The State did not charge Ms. Luna with breach of fiduciary duty or violation of the
Uniform Power of Attorney Act. If she had been charged with either of these offenses, the State
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is correct that it would be irrelevant whether she and other woman had received generous gifts
from Mr. Hofferber in the past, and whether she had free access to Mr. Hofferber’s bank account.
But the State charged Ms. Luna with exploitation of a vulnerable adult, a felony offense under
I.C. § 18-1505(3). (R., pp.41-42.) Whether Ms. Luna exceeded her authority under the springing
power of attorney is relevant to the charged crime, but it is not determinative. The critical
question was whether Ms. Luna’s admitted use of Mr. Hofferber’s funds was unjust or improper.
The answer to this question depends on Ms. Luna’s intent, which in turn depends on her
understanding of Mr. Hofferber’s intent. The evidence Ms. Luna sought to introduce was
relevant to her theory of the case, and thus should not have been excluded under I.R.E. 401.
The State cites Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457 (2018), in support of its assertion
that powers of attorney in Idaho are strictly construed. (Respondent’s Br., p.15.) Ms. Luna does
not dispute this statement of the law. And Matter of Estate of Smith might be a useful case to
consider if it involved criminal charges being brought against the individual (Smith’s son) who
made the transactions at issue in that case. But Matter of Estate of Smith did not involve criminal
charges; instead, the case stemmed from a will contest. See Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho
at 463. The State cites three additional cases in support of its argument that Mr. Hofferber’s
history of generosity was irrelevant. (Respondent’s Br., pp.15-16.) But these are all civil cases,
not criminal cases, and none weigh on the legal question presented here. See Townsend v. United
States, 889 F. Supp. 369 (D. Neb. 1995) (tax refund case seeking refund of federal estate tax);
Kunewa v. Joshua, 924 P.2d 559 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (civil fraud and breach of trust case);
Praefke v. Am. Enter. Life Ins. Co., 655 N.W.2d 456 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (civil breach of
fiduciary case).
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The State appears to believe that Ms. Luna’s conduct “was unjust or improper . . . no
matter how generous Mr. Hofferber was while he had capacity,” because the springing power of
attorney did not provide her with the power to give herself a gift. (Respondent’s Br., p.17.)
Whether Ms. Luna’s conduct was unjust or improper is a factual question, not a legal one, and it
cannot be resolved simply by looking at the language of the springing power of attorney. The
district court erred in preventing Ms. Luna from presenting evidence to the jury that was relevant
to her theory of the case.1

B.

The District Court Erred In Prohibiting Ms. Luna From Presenting Evidence Of
Particular Instances Of Mr. Hofferber’s Generosity
As Ms. Luna argued in her Appellants’ Brief, the district court abused its discretion in

concluding Mr. Hofferber’s history of giving gifts to Ms. Luna and other women was
inadmissible under I.R.E. 404 because it fell within the exception set forth in I.R.E. 404(a)(2)(B),
and was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b)(2). (Appellant’s Br., pp.11-14.) Ms. Luna relies on the
argument contained in her Appellant’s Brief on this issue, but includes this section to address the
State’s contention that the district court “gave an additional and alternative ground for excluding
specific instances evidence.” (Respondent’s Br., p.20.) The State reads the district court to have
excluded Ms. Luna’s proffered specific-instance evidence under I.R.E. 403, citing to two
1

The State appears to argue that Ms. Luna somehow invited the error in the trial court.
(Respondent’s Br., pp.16-17.) The State argues Ms. Luna “seems to have concluded herself that
the fact that she had access to [Mr. Hofferber’s] account under a power of attorney in no way
suggests that the manner of her access was just and proper.” (Respondent’s Br., p.16.) The State
points out that defense counsel objected “based on prior rulings,” when Ms. Urzua testified that
she saw “a lot of transactions coming out of his account that weren’t typical for him . . . a lot of
travel expenses to Cactus Pete’s.” (Tr., pp.170-71.) Ms. Luna does not read her trial counsel’s
objection as in any way conceding that her conduct was unjust or improper. Instead, Ms. Luna
reads her trial counsel’s objection as completely plausible and consistent with her theory of the
case—that she was permitted to use Mr. Hofferber’s funds as she pleased, and her taking of
money from the proceeds of the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s house was neither unjust nor unlawful.
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portions of the trial transcript. (Respondent’s Br., p.20, citing Tr., pp.126, 143-44.) As the State
acknowledges, Ms. Luna addressed the district court’s passing reference to I.R.E. 403 in the
Appellant’s Brief, reading it as a misstatement intending to refer to I.R.E. 404. (See Appellant’s
Br., p.12, n.3; Respondent’s Br., p.20.) Ms. Luna continues to believe the district court intended
to refer to I.R.E. 404, not I.R.E. 403, because the district court was discussing character
evidence, and was not balancing the probative value of relevant evidence. At the additional point
noted by the State in its Respondent’s Brief, Tr., the district court said:
All right, well, I suppose generosity is a pertinent trait in a case where the defense
is “this was a gift,” and so you can introduce evidence of Mr. Hofferber’s
character for generosity but you may only do so in the form of opinion or
reputation evidence under Rule 403. Rule 404 limits specific instances of conduct,
and the act of him giving Ms. Luna other sums of money is a specific instance of
conduct, and as I indicated before, I don’t think that’s relevant to whether he gave
her a gift on either of these two occasions.
(Tr., pp.143-44.) The district court reiterated its earlier ruling that Ms. Luna’s proffered evidence
was not relevant, and did not make a ruling under I.R.E. 403.

C.

The District Court’s Evidentiary Errors Were Not Harmless
The State cannot show that the district court’s evidentiary errors were “unimportant in

relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question,” and thus cannot meet its
burden of proving the errors were harmless. See State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 661, 674 (2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Ms. Luna wanted to tell the jury that Mr. Hofferber
bought her a Range Rover in November 2016 (well before he was incapacitated); gave her a
significant amount of money; took her on lavish vacations; paid her rent; and paid for private
school for her daughter. (R., pp.97-98; PSI, pp.5, 120; Tr., p.122.) She wanted to tell the jury
about how she used her power of attorney on Mr. Hofferber’s bank account to withdraw and
deposit funds, which she treated as her own. (Tr., pp.127, 130; R., p.100.) She wanted the jury to
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know that Mr. Hofferber shared his financial resources freely with her, just like a husband and
wife, and wanted her to share in what he had.
The State asserts the evidence the district court excluded regarding Mr. Hofferber’s
generosity and Ms. Luna’s access to his bank account had “extraordinarily minimal (in fact, nonexistent) probative value.” (Respondent’s Br., p.23.) As discussed above, the State is wrong. The
evidence was relevant to Ms. Luna’s theory of the case, and the effect of the district court’s error
in excluding the evidence is not minimal compared to the probative force of the record
suggesting Ms. Luna’s guilt. See Garcia, 166 Idaho 674 (discussing harmless error review).
The State asserts Mr. Luna “did not provide any evidence, explanation, or theory as to
why she would have been entitled to the $60,000 from Mr. Hofferber’s bank account,” citing
generally to 141 pages of the trial transcript. (Respondent’s Br., p.25.) The State fails to
acknowledge Detective Fawley’s testimony that Ms. Luna told him she had “a preexisting
agreement with Skip to give her that money [from the proceeds of the sale of his house] to pay
off two cars and to help her pay for her daughter’s schooling.” (Tr., p.220.) The jury would have
been more likely to credit this testimony if it had the evidence Ms. Luna sought to admit
regarding Mr. Hofferber’s generosity and her use of his bank account. As such, the district
court’s evidentiary errors were not harmless.
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II.
The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury Regarding The Requirements For GiftGiving Under The Uniform Power Of Attorney Act

A.

The District Court Created A Fatal Variance By Instructing The Jury Regarding The
Civil Requirements For Gift-Giving
The critical question for the jury to decide with respect to Count II was whether Ms. Luna

exploited Mr. Hofferber when she took funds exceeding $1,000 from sale of his house, for her
own use. (See R., p.97.) The jury was instructed, consistent with the statute, that the word
“exploitation” includes “the unjust or improper use of a vulnerable adult’s financial power of
attorney . . . .” (See R., p.156; I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c).) By giving Instruction No. 12 to the jury, the
district court lowered the State’s burden of proof, as it allowed the jury to find Ms. Luna
exploited Mr. Hofferber simply because she did not comply with the requirements for gift-giving
set forth in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which is a civil act with its own remedy
provision. See I.C. § 15-12-117 (stating an agent who violates the Act “is liable to the principal .
. . for the amount required to” restore the value of the principal’s property and reimburse the
principal for associated attorney’s fees and costs).
The State asserts Ms. Luna’s argument that Instruction No. 12 deprived her of her right to
fair notice of the charges against her “is premised on an absurdly demanding and unrealistic
pleading standard that is contrary to existing law.” (Respondent’s Br., p.30.) The State argues
“[i]t does not create a variance . . . that defense counsel was apparently unaware of applicable
law in Idaho regarding what an agent under a power of attorney is or is not legally authorized to
do.” (Respondent’s Br., p.30.) The State is incorrect.
As an initial matter, both defense counsel and the prosecutor appeared to be unaware of
the requirements of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. The prosecutor requested jury
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instructions that were consistent with the allegations in the charging document, see R., pp.41-42,
and the pattern jury instruction, see ICJI 1293, and did not request that the jury be instructed
regarding the power of agents under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (see R., pp.87-90.) The
district court brought up the Uniform Power of Attorney Act sua sponte. (See Tr., p.240.) The
prosecutor told the district court he would submit a proposed instruction regarding the
requirements of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, but he did not; instead, the district court
drafted Instruction No. 12 on its own. (See Tr., p.241; R., p.153; see generally R., pp.6-7.)
More importantly, whether or not the attorneys were aware of the civil requirements of
the Uniform Power of Attorney Act is irrelevant, as the the civil requirements cannot be read into
the criminal statute. The State asserts “[i]t is hardly unique that a civil statute informs the
application of a criminal statue.” (Respondent’s Br., p.31.) The State cites State v. Bennett, 150
Idaho 278 (2010), and State v. Dix, 166 Idaho 851 (2010), as cases where the court applied
principles from the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to define the scope of a theft statute.
(Respondent’s Br., p.31.) These cases do not support the State’s position in the case. The fact
that the Idaho Supreme Court looked, in Bennett and Dix, to the UCC to determine possessory
rights for purposes of criminal theft charges, has no bearing on whether the district court erred in
instructing the jury regarding the Uniform Power of Attorney Act in a case involved alleged
criminal exploitation.
Ms. Luna does not contend (and did not argue to the jury) that her act of taking money
from the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s house was a proper exercise of her springing power of attorney
under the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. Instead, she argued her actions were neither unjust
nor improper within the meaning of I.C. § 18-1505(3). Instruction No. 12 lowered the State’s
burden of proving this essential element of its case.
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The State contends Instruction No. 12 did not lower the State’s burden of proof because
“it simply instructed the jury regarding a correct legal proposition relevant to the question of
whether Luna’s conduct was improper or unjust.” (Respondent’s Br., p.31.) The State cites a
decision from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, State v. Columbus, No. C4-00-1950, 2001 WL
95007 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 21 2001) (unpublished), in support of its argument. (Respondent’s
Br., p.31.) In addition to being unpublished, and thus non-precedential under Minn.
Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3(b) (1989), Columbus does not support the State’s argument.
The jury in Columbus was not instructed regarding the civil standard for a power of
attorney; rather, the Columbus Court simply noted the civil standard in finding the evidence was
sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. See Columbus, 2001 WL 95007, *2. This is
significant. The problem here is not that the district court knew of the requirements of the
Uniform Power of Attorney Act, but that it instructed the jury on these requirements, permitting
the jury to read the requirements into the criminal code.2
The critical question in this case, again, was whether Ms. Luna’s actions were unjust or
improper. See I.C. § 18-1505(4)(c). In answering this question, Ms. Luna’s intent matters.
Mr. Hofferber’s intent also matters, as “there should be some flexibility in the concept of consent
to allow for the fact that even a transfer away from an incompetent person might not be
exploitation.” Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution A Problem?, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 279 (2003). By instructing the jury regarding the civil requirements for
2

Tellingly, the Minnesota Legislature changed the definition of the crime of financial
exploitation of a vulnerable adult following Columbus so as to specifically incorporate legal
standards for a fiduciary recognized elsewhere in the law. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2335, subd. 1(1)
(2013) (“Whoever does any of the following acts commits the crime of financial exploitation: (1)
in breach of a fiduciary obligation recognized elsewhere in law . . . intentionally . . . fails to use
the . . . financial resources of the vulnerable adult to provide food, clothing, shelter, health care,
therapeutic conduct, or supervision for the vulnerable adult”) (emphasis added). The Idaho
statute does not incorporate standards recognized elsewhere in law. See I.C. § 18-1505(3).
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gift-giving, the district court permitted the jury to read intent out of this case. That is, the jury
could, and likely did, find Ms. Luna guilty because the springing power of attorney did not
permit her to take money from the sale of Mr. Hofferber’s house. Counsel for Ms. Luna had this
exactly right at trial—the district court’s instruction took a civil prohibition and turned it into a
crime. (Tr., pp.294-95.) The instruction resulted in a fatal variance, which means the jury verdict
on Count II must be vacated. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her Appellant’s Brief, Ms. Luna
respectfully requests that the Court vacate her conviction, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of June, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of June, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

AWR/eas

11

